

Global Reliance

July / August 2005

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Air Force Office of Special Investigations

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Global Reliance

Air Force Office of
Special Investigations
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Col. Dana A. Simmons
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On the Cover
A young Airman is depicted behind bars on an "Air Force dollar."
(Graphic by James C. Dillard)



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OSI Stories

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The Global Reliance is a funded Class II Air Force magazine for the Office of Special Investigations. Opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the United States Air Force. Items for publication may be submitted to: HQ AFOSI/PA 1535 Command Dr. Suite C309 Andrews Air Force Base, Md. 20762-7002. The editor reserves the right to edit or cut articles to fill requirements for clarity or space. Submissions may be sent to: James.Dillard@ogn.af.mil or Global@ogn.af.mil.

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
The chair

Fixing the broken chairs is only the beginning

Col. Dana A. Simmons
OSI Commander

I've come to realize many things in the short time I've been your commander, one of which is that OSI has a great future ahead. To achieve that greatness, we're all going to need to work hard and support each other. There will likely be some tough times ahead, but together we'll overcome all the obstacles.

As many of you heard during my first commander's call, I have four basic principles that guide me: Service, Ownership, OSI family and the determination to Never quit. These principles form my "SOON" concept.



Over the next few articles, I'll share each part of "SOON" with you, so we can learn together what it's going to take to achieve the greatness OSI is capable of.

We'll begin the articles with a discussion about service. I AM HERE TO SERVE YOU. Leaders exist to serve the troops under their command. Every day my goal is to do something to benefit you. If I've accomplished that, I have done my job as commander, and that should help you do your job, executing the mission. I regularly walk around the headquarters building and ask people, "What have you done for the field lately?" I'd like everyone to ask themselves similar questions, such as "What have I accomplished today?", "What problem have I solved?", and "How have I served?"

I have a story that illustrates the simplicity of service. I call it the "broken chair" story, and it occurred back when I was a detachment commander. On my first day in my new unit, I realized it was a good unit, but there was no sense of "team." They just didn't seem to like each other very much, but there was one exception. There was

Col. Dana A. Simmons
OSI Commander

I am asking you to serve, and I am promising I will serve you to the best of my ability.



an older, local national gentleman who had been with OSI for a very long time. He seemed to be well thought of by the troops because of his age and experience.

As I went around the detachment introducing myself with the intent of reinforcing the concept of "What can I do for you as your leader?", I was surprised at the comments made by this gentleman.

Specifically, he had a problem with his seat, which was a small typing chair. It didn't have a back for him to rest against; all it had was a broken metal post. His bad back made it painful for him to sit in that chair, which he'd had for six or seven years.

You might be asking yourself, "Well, why didn't he just get a new chair?" He tried, but despite having made several requests, he was ignored. Although he seemed frustrated about his chair, he completed his story by telling me how much he loved working for OSI.

I was thinking about what

he said as I walked back into my office and looked at my brand new desk chair.

I knew what I had to do. I just rolled that chair down to his office.

He was gone when I arrived, so I went ahead and put it behind his desk and went back to work (ok, so I did stop at the admin. office and ask them to order me a new chair).

A few hours later, this gentleman came to my office with tears in his eyes. He said no one ever really listened to him before and nobody had cared to help him with his broken chair.

I was surprised something so simple had such a big impact on this individual.

This one small act ignited the other members of that unit and reminded them why they were a part of the Air Force – SERVICE.

As Albert Einstein said, "Only a life lived for others is a life worthwhile." I am asking you to serve, and I am promising I will serve you to the best of my ability. **GR**

SOON
"SOON" stands for **Service, Ownership, OSI family and the determination to Never quit. Colonel Simmons will use this concept to guide OSI's mission.**



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OSI agents prepare for deployment

Global War on Terrorism calls for strict training

A Det. 2408 agent conducts a counter-surveillance mission near an entry control point at a deployed location.



SA Jim (alias for security purposes)
Defense Computer Investigations Training Program Instructor

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have permanently changed the character of our organization.

Whereas OSI once performed counterintelligence and force protection ranging from permissive to semi-hostile environments, the organization has transitioned to one whose mission includes operating in completely denied and combat areas.

As a consequence, OSI must successfully meet that challenge if it is to effectively and continuously support the Air Force and Department of Defense operations worldwide.

The demand on OSI is so intense, it is probably only a matter of time before any particular agent is selected (or volunteers) to deploy to one of the many hotspots that comprise the Global War on Terrorism.

At these detachments, operations are typically not "business as usual." The threats at such locations are serious and unforgiving. One agent thus far has been killed, while another five were wounded in recent incidents.

Agents must prepare

actively for this eventuality, for their lives may depend on those preparations. That preparation entails a continuous commitment for agents.

This article is focused on the typical field agent that deploys, not those in the Antiterrorism Specialty Team.

AST agents typically receive advanced training suitable for deployment into a hostile environment; however, for any agent, a successful deployment is contingent on three key concepts: adequate and focused training, possession of sufficient and appropriate equipment, and pertinent experience, derived through first-hand exposure or by others' accounts.

This commitment starts with training. Agents must receive comprehensive pre-deployment and follow-on sustainment training.

The Advance Deployment Operations Course at Ft. Dix, N.J., currently performs this role. The course has several critical training points, including driving in a hostile environment, firefight scenarios, protective service operations and weapons training. The training also emphasizes physical fitness, which is a requisite for a successful hostile environment deployment.

For example while deployed, our detachment participated in a protective service operation that required the participation of all six of us.

An Army liaison requested

U.S. Air Force photo

our detachment provide protection to a high-ranking Iraqi official, who was due to arrive within 30 minutes. Our team quickly assembled its members, inspected vehicles, established routes, ensured the safety of those routes and performed equipment checks. The detachment then executed the operation. The operation was accomplished successfully due to the professionalism of the detachment and the training each had received at ADOC.

We should augment our training by reading a few pertinent books on the Middle East and South Asia, Iraq and Afghanistan. We should also augment training with writings concerning counterintelligence. Iraqis and Afghans have unique and sometimes-impenetrable cultures requiring concerted study before the agent deploys.

The Arab Mind, by Raphael Patai, is a must read on Arab philosophy in particular. Although the author mostly speaks in generalities, much of what he writes can be applied to the Iraqi or Afghani mindset. By reading this book, a reader will discover the stark differences in how an Arab thinks.

Another work, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy*, by Daniel Pipes, describes how Arabs see their world, and how the West, especially Israel, inappropriately intervenes.

According to the book, Arabs are powerless and oppressed pawns, which creates a condition of repressed anger and blame-shifting.

Understanding Terror Networks, by Marc Sageman, describes how a terrorist cell operates. The book is applicable for either deployed theater

Going to the desert

Deploying agents should be proficient at operating issued equipment. Their tactical gear includes efficient body armor, weather-appropriate clothing (especially heat-wicking shirts) and electronics like GPS devices and digital cameras.

and gives great insight as to the motivations of individual cell members.

Finally, the hard-to-find *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to be a Counterintelligence Officer*, by William R. Johnson, stands out as a comprehensive account of how we as CI agents do our jobs.

Some of the material is basic, but taken as a whole, the book articulates concepts the typical agent perhaps intrinsically knew but had not completely articulated.

Of the books mentioned, *The Hidden Hand* stands out as the most poignant. I encountered several of its concepts illustrated on Baghdad's streets.

For example, the typical Iraqi (read: Arab) was convinced that Israel was responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. No presentation of evidence, no matter how comprehensive, could persuade an Iraqi that Muslims were capable of such barbarity. The most one could hope to gain was a reluctant admission that the Israeli government (as opposed to "renegade" Israeli agents) did not necessarily sanction the attack.

Deploying agents should

also be proficient at operating issued equipment. Tactical gear includes efficient body armor, weather-appropriate clothing (especially heat-wicking shirts) and electronics like Global Positioning System devices and digital cameras. ADOC covers some of these topics, but not all agents bring all assigned equipment to the course.

Agents should also keep abreast of the current overseas tactical situation via the OSI Web site located on SIPRNET. That site, and numerous others, like Central Command's presence, and the individual combat divisions sites include current intelligence summaries culled from the various deployed units and command organizations (1st Cavalry Division, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, etc.).

To be armed with the most

Reading AARs and speaking to previously-deployed agents provides an incomparable view of what life is like in hostile deployed environments.

current information, deploying agents should read agents', superintendents' and detachment commanders' after-action reports from those deployment locations.

AARs, in particular, contain a wealth of information. It will often discuss issues and problems the deploying agent may

encounter at that detachment.

Knowing about those issues in advance could enable the agent to provide a solution upon his or her arrival.

It is not uncommon a detachment is unaware or unable to solve an issue, simply due to its proximity to the problem.

An external look is sometimes all that is required to solve a particular problem.

By taking these pertinent measures, agents can best arm themselves with the knowledge and skills necessary to successfully complete a rotation to a hostile environment.

The importance of the training that ADOC offers is not always readily apparent. An agent may make it halfway through a deployment before he or she applies a previously-learned technique.

Reading AARs and speaking to previously-deployed agents provides an incomparable view of what life is like in hostile deployed environments.

OSI commitments to support these worldwide missions are unlikely to wane in the not-too-distant future. The United States continues to assist Iraq in fighting insurgents and foreign fighters.

We are committed to aid Iraq's transition to a sovereign, peaceful state. U.S. forces also continue to operate in Afghanistan, both to assist the nascent government, and to continue to search for Osama bin Laden, his lieutenants and remnants of the al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

OSI must stand ready to meet those challenges. **GR**

Insurgency in Kazturkistan

Aliases have been used in this article for security purposes

OSI participates in deployment training designed to prepare Airmen for Middle East assignments

The American convoy, comprised primarily of Airmen from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, drove carefully through Kazturkistan's arid deserts.

Their goal was to establish a forward deployed airbase.

Their initial objectives included setting up tents and

establishing a security perimeter.

Intelligence reports indicated foreign nationals would likely become hostile when the Americans arrived, but all the locals did was stand by the side of the road and raise their hands to the skies.

What this new airbase needed was some opposition from the local nationals to set the stage for the exercise.

Hill AFB Air Force Office of Special Investigations Det. 103, Hill AFB 75th Security Forces Squadron and a group of Army members were on hand to provide that service.

It only took a few hours for the convoy to arrive in Kazturkistan after leaving Hill in the early morning of June 7.

The convoy training was the first of four days of participation in the deployment exercise at the Utah Test and Training Range in the desert of Northern Utah.

The training was geared toward preparing Airmen for upcoming deployments to the Middle East and providing them with the necessary skills to operate

Story courtesy of
OSI Det. 113

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effectively in an unfamiliar environment.

It was the job of the opposition forces to inject tailored training scenarios to cover the full spectrum of events. The realistic scenarios included entry control point assaults, non-threatening country nationals approaching the base, suicide bombings, a hostage-taking and interrogation scenario, convoy attacks on remote desert roads and nighttime airbase ground attacks.

These scenarios provided the opportunity to practice physical security and defense and also allowed the exercise participants to practice other essential skill sets, such as self-aid and buddy care, Code of Conduct, weapons control and accountability, and host nation relations.

Whereas all other base exercises are geared toward responding to nation-level war plans not associated with OIF or OEF, this exercise was specifically designed to prepare Hill Airmen for upcoming duty throughout all area of responsibilities.

SAs Johnson and Smith, Det. 113, were members of the opposition forces team.

Agent Johnson and the Army team's leadership began developing the opposition force's portions of the UTTR exercise months before the exercise kicked off, closely coordinating with the exercise commander and his staff to ensure training objectives were met.

"SA Johnson's recent deployment to Iraq allowed OSI to bring a current, real-world perspective to the threat scenarios and the tactics involved in countering the threats," Agent Smith said.



Members of the opposition forces interrogate an Airmen they captured during the exercise.

Feedback sessions after each scenario provided Airmen the opportunity to discuss the stages of the attack and the strengths and weaknesses of their response.

"There was synergy in the air during this exercise, giving everyone the opportunity to look at current airbase ground defense and convoy security procedures through the eyes of an insurgent," said SA Smith. "This unique perspective allowed the opposition forces to better understand how a strong security posture can go far in preventing a

successful attack."

The opposition forces found themselves playing out the stages leading up to an attack by becoming familiar with the insurgents' preparation efforts.

"The opportunity to live the attack



A captured convoy member is led away by a member of the opposition forces. Two OSI agents participated in the exercise as insurgents.

cycle through the eyes of the opposition provided valuable antiterrorism and force protection lessons to the opposition forces players," Agent Smith said.

The Army opposition forces members provided the Airmen with a convoy security operations course before sending them on a convoy mission, staging a combined opposition forces attack to test and emphasize the training points.

During the attacks, both sides of the fight used blank ammunition in their weapons combined with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System to make the scenarios as realistic as possible, while also emphasizing the importance of weapons handling, shot accuracy and the use of adequate cover. Mock insurgents donned Middle Eastern-style clothing and added a matching accent to provide a more realistic training environment.

Hill Explosive Ordnance Disposal members also contributed to the exercises. They delivered powerful, timed, controlled explosions to simulate improvised explosive device attacks.

"The sound, feel and sight of a sizeable explosion is something that should be experienced first hand to fully appreciate and know how you will physically respond to such an event," Agent Smith said.

Agent Smith said he'd like to thank everyone who helped make the exercise a success.

"Because of the exercises, the 182 Airmen who took part in the training won't experience these attacks for the first time in theater," he said. **GR**

The sound, feel and sight of a sizeable explosion is something that should be experienced first hand to fully appreciate and know how you will physically respond to such an event.

-SA Smith



Airman Joshua Terrell was found playing “Play Station” video games at his friend's house when Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents found and apprehended him.

Airman Terrell, a member of the 729th Air Control Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, was the subject of a narcotics investigation when he dropped off the radar and went Absent Without Leave. He had tested positive for methamphetamines on a random urinalysis.

“During his subject interview with us, the subject informed SA Brad Behselich and myself that his first sergeant had already informed him he was positive, so he had gone to

speak with the Hill Area Defense Council,” said SA Nathan Kerbs, OSI Det. 113, Hill AFB.

Following the interview, SA's Kerbs and Behselich took Airman Terrell for hair follicle sample drug testing. After hair follicle collection, Agent Kerbs said Airman Terrell made the comment, “I will see you when the results are returned.” His hair follicles subsequently tested positive for methamphetamines.

February 14, Master Sgt. Jaye Kassebaum, 729 ACS first sergeant, notified Agent Kerbs that Terrell had not reported to work since February 1 and was listed as a deserter.

Sergeant Kassebaum believed the wayward-

Airman was in the local area and might be staying with his girlfriend, a dependant wife of an active duty military member. Agents from Det. 113 conducted a sweep of apartment complexes throughout the local area where Airman Terrell may have been living or hiding. A criminal alert notice and wanted posters were produced and distributed throughout Hill and surrounding areas.

“We monitored nightclubs Airman Terrell frequently attended, malls that he shopped at and his friends’ residences,” Agent Kerbs said. “A search of his dormitory was also conducted, resulting in the discovery of two of his coworker's uniforms.”

Agents interviewed the two coworkers, but they didn't provide any infor-

See **Caught** on page 15

Catching the AWOL Airman

A young Airman learns there are better ways to spend an Air Force check

Story courtesy of
AFOSI Det. 113

Hacker on

Article courtesy of
Det. 502, Information
Operations and
Investigations Office

U.S.A. STREET

Using his skills as a hacker, an Italian citizen managed to make off with usernames and Web server passwords from the Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., system.

Their Network Security Division caught the activity and managed to block any further malicious activities.

Special Agent Billy Evans, Det. 401, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, Information Operations and Investigations, was assigned to the intrusion. He contacted Det. 502 IOI, Sembach, Germany, to determine the hacker's identity and location. SA Joel Folkerts, Det. 502 IOI, responded by contacting SA Frank Brunetti, Det. 535 IOI, Rome, Italy, who went to his Italian counterparts to investigate the hacker's identity.

The agents waited nearly two weeks before getting their response. Just when they thought they'd reached a dead end, they discovered the

hacker made a critical mistake.

Most experienced hackers use a string of compromised computers when hacking, which prevents investigators from easily determining the source of the intrusion. This hacker wasn't as

savvy because he hacked the Tinker AFB system from his bedroom in Eboli, a small southern Italy village.

SA Randy Reynosa, Det. 502 IOI, met with Agent Brunetti and the Italian State Police to

discuss the specifics of the investigation. The

investigators agreed to seek a joint search warrant for the hacker's residence.

“We couldn't believe our luck. First we got the hacker's address and then a quick confession.”

- SA Joel Folkerts

SA Michael Thyssen, FIS 53rd Operating Location-B, Naples, Italy, and SA Folkerts coordinated the rallying point and arrived Saturday morning.

“We could sense we were about to be part of something huge,” Agent Folkerts said. “We met with the Italian officials who informed us they were about to secure the residence.”

The Italians felt it was safer to first secure the residence before the Americans went in. Since they weren't armed, the agents agreed.

A few minutes later, the waiting investigators received word the scene was secured and the warrant was to proceed as scheduled.

“We were glad to be accompanied by the local police officers,” Agent Folkerts said.

The agents approached the apartment complex and began to climb the small, darkened stairwell. A pair of adults stood at the entry of the small apartment looking confused and bewildered as they watched the Americans enter their home.

SAs Folkerts and Thyssen approached the tiny bedroom where a small army of Italian investigators huddled over a desktop computer and lap-

See Hacker on page 15

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Caught continued from page 10

mation as to Airman Terrell's whereabouts.

A few weeks later, SAs Chris Palmer, Matt Page and Brad Earman received a tip that Airman Terrell's girlfriend wanted to meet with one of his coworkers. A meeting was set up between the coworker and girlfriend. Agents were in place, but the girlfriend never arrived.

SAs Kerbs and Behselich, and Deputy Dean Knightly, U. S. Marshals Service, conducted neighborhood inquiries March 16 at places where the girlfriend previously lived in an attempt to locate Airman Terrell. Airman Terrell's coworker and a friend of his girlfriend occupied one of the addresses.

During an interview of that coworker, agents discovered Airman Terrell's girlfriend used to work at the Green Whale

Tavern, a nearby establishment. The owner of the Green Whale informed the agents Airman Terrell was living in Murray, Utah, with a friend in his apartment complex.

The marshal's confidential informant confirmed he recently saw Airman Terrell at that apartment complex.

OSI and USMS agents arrived at the apartment complex and attempted to conduct an interview with the current resident. When he answered the door Deputy Knightly saw Airman Terrell in the resi-



Airman Terrell

dence.

"There appeared to be illegal narcotics, narcotic paraphernalia and bond paper with what appeared to counterfeit currency printed on it surrounding the area where Airman Terrell was sitting," Agent Kerb said.

Airman Terrell was arrested and transported to jail. Agent Kerb said Airman Terrell expressed relief he was caught, saying he "was tired of not being able to go anywhere without being worried about getting caught."

Airman Terrell's friend said that he smoked "meth" throughout the night before being apprehended.

His urine tested positive for cocaine, amphetamines and methamphetamines. Airman Terrell was sentenced to confinement at Maelstrom Air Force Base, Mont., until his pending court date. **GR**

Hacker continued from page 11

top. As luck would have it, the hacker was scared into submission and was already typing his initial confession.

"We couldn't believe our luck," SA Folkerts said. "First we got the hacker's address and then a quick confession."

After nearly two hours of questioning, the Italian and American investigators were satisfied with the confession.

The 23-year old computer

Something to chew on

To ensure the investigators were as comfortable as possible, the hacker's mother occasionally checked in with them to see if they'd like coffee or candy while they interrogated her son about his malicious computer activities.

science student cooperated by locating hidden computer equipment, providing packaging materials and assisting authorities with packing it all up.

"We'd never seen such a

cooperative subject before," Agent Folkerts said.

The mother even periodically asked the investigators if they would like coffee or candy to snack on while they interrogated her eldest son.

The hacker initially stated he simply logged onto the system but didn't hack into it. The agents provided evidence contrary to his claims, so the young man came clean.

As the agents left the small household, they noticed they were standing on U.S.A. Street, something Agent Folkerts said the entire force found amusing.

The Italian investigation is still proceeding. The hacker may face up to eight years in prison if convicted. **GR**

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Some agents may be under the impression that there has only been one Air Force Office of Special Investigations badge, the distinctive gold shield designed by Capt. Robert Ray in 1948.

From an Air Force-wide perspective, they'd be correct. Technically, however, they're wrong because an exception exists. The exception is the "Kripo" or Kriminal Polizei (criminal police) badge carried by OSI agents in Germany, primarily during the 1950s and 1960s. Most within OSI have never seen nor heard of the Kripo badge and few know anything about its origins.

According to Don Bible, the foremost American collector of German police warrant or identification discs (erkennungsmarke), the history of these discs goes back to January 1810, when Berlin officials first authorized an identification warrant (round disc) for local criminal police. Other police district officials followed suit, and the round consecutively numbered disc emblazoned with a flying eagle soon became commonly accepted throughout the Prussian State. The reverse side of the disc carried German wording that translated to "Royal Prussian Police Official."

A century later, Nazi officials adopted their own version of this disc known by the old name of erkennungsmarke until 1944 when the designation was changed to dienstmarke (service mark). Dienstmarken were used in conjunction with a dienstausweise (service identification card) which carried a photograph of the agent along with very limited information consisting of the name of the police district employing the agent, an official seal, and the agent's signature.

A statement was also shown on the dienstausweise indicating the agent was allowed to carry and draw ammunition for a weapon. It also included the agent's number matching his warrant disc. The card was intended only for agent use as identification to other police agents or persons of authority, while the disc was used for making arrests, etc.

The antecedents of the OSI Kripo badge seem clearly rooted in the history of

both the German Kriminal Polizei and the Geheime Staats Polizei (secret state police, or Gestapo) warrant discs.

In the 1950s, OSI agents in Europe were involved in various covert intelligence activities that were subsequently transferred to U.S. Air Intelligence. One OSI agent, the late Ralph Malone, was supposedly responsible for introducing to Air Intelligence a badge similar to the Kripo badge, except it had the words Sicherheit Dienst (Security Service) inscribed on it rather than Kriminal Polizei (Kripo).

This badge was similar to the metal "identification" disc carried by Nazi-era secret and criminal police agency personnel. SA Malone was also the one who supposedly introduced use of the Kripo disc or badge to OSI upon resumption of his OSI status after his work with Air Intelligence.

During the "Occupation" period, a Kripo or Security Service badge displayed by U.S. Forces investigative or intelligence agents usually intimidated German citizens into cooperating with the agents because of the association of such a badge with German investigative authorities.

The OSI Kripo badge is made of brass, oval in shape with a hole punched in one end, measures approximately two inches wide by two inches tall and has a thickness of about one-sixteenth of an inch. The badge was designed to be carried in the agent's pants pocket, attached to a chain that in turn was attached to the agent's belt loop or belt.

It was issued to agents upon arrival in Germany, along with a

Different Badge Different Era

Agents donned the Kripo badge after World War II

by Lt. Col. Jim Crumpacker



Illustration by James C. Dillard. Badge image provided by Lt. Col. Jim Crumpacker

civilian identification card and a government driver's license. The policy, as agents generally understood it, was to use the Kripo badge as identification in all official dealings with local nationals, although there were some exceptions with German police officials. I am sure that a written policy directive governing the control, issue, and use of these badges existed at one time, but I have yet to find it.

I have seen three variations of the OSI Kripo badge, each essentially the same as the others except for the numbering scheme. The first reads "Amerikanische Kriminalpolizei" and is numbered "31-38."

I suspect this badge was a "first issue," used by 31st Military Police, Criminal Investigation Division agents after the unit's move from Birmingham, England, to Wiesbaden, Germany, on Nov. 2, 1945.

Use of the badge most likely continued until the unit was deactivated March 11, 1949, when the CID personnel were transferred to the Air Force CID of the Special Investigations Section, Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters U. S. Air Forces in Europe. The second badge reads the same as the first but is numbered "AF-84." The "AF" numbering scheme might be an indicator these badges were authorized and manufactured not by OSI, but by some higher command and were also used by the other branches of the service. Supposedly a die for stamping out the badges was kept in a safe at the CID Wiesbaden headquarters.

It's believed these badges may have been broadly used by the Army CID and Counter Intelligence Corps, and the AF CIC and CID (CID was eventually merged into OSI).

The third badge reads the same as the first two except it also includes the initials "OSI" and "USAFE" with a three-digit number centered between the two sets of initials. This badge was the last issue, or design used prior to the badges being taken out of service during the mid-1970s.

The first badge of this design I ever saw was numbered "070" which coincidentally was the number designating the OSI district in Germany (District 70). This caused speculation the badges stopped being individually numbered and were simply numbered



Fake and Real

(Top) An Original Secret Police disc (Geheime Staatspolizei) GESTAPO early non-magnetic version.

(Bottom) A Fake Gestapo disc produced in Poland, about 1994. Excellent high-quality fake.

Difficult to identify without good magnification and knowledge of originals. There are a number of other types of reproductions of the Gestapo disc. Many have the stamped code M 9/86 under the eagle. Originals never had anything stamped under the eagle.

(Information and images courtesy of R. Donahue Bible.)

to reflect the district number.

I'm confident this is not the case, however, as throughout the years I've seen four or five of these badges, each with a different number starting with "0," including one numbered in the thirties and a couple in the sixties.

According to several retired agents, who served in Germany during the Occupation period following WWII (ending in 1955) and through the early 1960s, the use of the Kripo badge by OSI agents with local nationals, whether German or Displaced Persons, was a total "Open Sesame."

All you had to do was tell a local national you were from the Amerikanische Polizei, show that brass badge and the doors opened. During the Occupation period, all OSI agents wore civilian clothing and all other Americans (except for the few civilian employees) wore military uniforms. Those in uniform were subject to a curfew. Civilian clothing clearly tagged the OSI agents as American criminal police.

OSI agents in an off-duty status were also subject to the curfew. In most cases, however, Air Police patrol entering bars after curfew checking for military personnel were "blind" when they looked at OSI.

Real OSI Kripo badges are extremely hard to find and facsimiles do exist. Specifically, agents rotating out of Germany were often presented with a pen holder mounted on a black onyx stone base with a facsimile Kripo badge attached to it.

The facsimiles I've seen are identical to the third variation previously described, except an individual's name is typically shown between "OSI" and "USAFE" instead of a number.

The facsimile badges are not as thick as the real badges and do not have a hole for attaching a chain; they also have a shinier finish than the genuine badges. In addition, they have sharper lettering than the originals.

So, if you are ever asked how many different officially authorized badges OSI has had throughout its more than 50 years, you now know the answer — two! **GR**

Editor's notes: Colonel Crumpacker thanks Ed Hagerty, Dick Law and the late Earl Middaugh, who provided invaluable information, without which this article would not have been possible. This article originally appeared in the January 2001 "Global Alliance." The author can be contacted via e-mail at: jhcrumpack@aol.com.

Letter writes OSI into existence

FBI puts controversial letter aside for three years before investigating validity

Christy Williamson

OSI Historian

As OSI celebrates its 57th anniversary on Aug. 1, it's worth taking a moment to reflect upon a key document that eventually propelled the organization into existence.

Though most of our veteran agents know the story, there are several more who do not know how one anonymous letter changed the course of Air Force history.

Three years before the establishment of OSI, a member of the Army Air Corps, who chose to remain nameless, composed a letter at the Hotel President in Kansas City, Miss., and sent it to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. In the letter, dated June 22, 1945, this serviceman described "certain irregularities" practiced by soon-to-be retired Maj. Gen. Bennett E. Meyers during his time as the deputy director of the Air Technical Service Command in Dayton, Ohio; activities from which he had derived an "immense profit." The servicemember, still on active duty with the Army Air Corps, would not reveal his identity, because he did not want to suffer the repercussions of being a whistle blower.

The receipt of the letter by the FBI could not have come at a more precarious time. The country was still in the throes of World War II, and while victory in Europe was won by the Allies the month before, the war in the Pacific theater was still raging. With so many U.S. forces still in harms way, officials feared the backlash that would almost certainly ensue if accusations of wrongdoing by a high-ranking military officer became public.

The letter was placed in a file at FBI Headquarters and did not resurface for two years.

In 1947, a Congressional committee

launched an investigation into possible fraudulent activities conducted by several companies during the War. While photocopying an entire FBI file on another organization, officials ran across the anonymous letter and began an inquiry into General Meyers' activities before and during the war.

In the months that followed, investigators uncovered the general's scheme of using his inside knowledge to rig the bidding and acquisition process at the Air Technical Service Command for his own profit. As reports of General Meyers' activities reached the press, the public became outraged and demanded action.

The idea that a general officer would conduct such shady dealings, and even possibly put his fellow Soldiers and Airmen at risk for his own financial gain, was deplorable, especially after the country had endured so much loss and suffering during the War. When the investigation concluded in March 1948, General Meyers was convicted of perjury and sentenced to five years in prison. He was stripped of his awards, decorations, and retirement pay and was forced to pay an income tax lien of more than \$200,000.

The General Meyers case prompted another Congressional investigation, this time into the criminal investigative capabilities of the military services.

The investigation revealed the Army's system of having their investigators report through the installation chain-of-command presented obvious conflicts of interest, which in turn hindered the objectivity of investigations.

Not wanting to adopt the inherent flaws in this system, the newly established Air Force asked the FBI for assistance in creating the Air Force's investigative capability. J. Edgar Hoover called upon one of his top assistants, Joseph F.

Carroll, to assist in the effort. Then Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington was so impressed with Mr. Carroll that he urged him to stay on board as the fledgling organization's first director. Thus, OSI was born.

Even without the General Meyers case, the Air Force would have undoubtedly established an investigative capability; however, without the information revealed during the General Meyers case, would it have simply been a recreation of the Army's investigative system?

Maybe not, but one could argue that the anonymous letter detailing General Meyers' activities, written three years before OSI's inception, ultimately brought to the forefront the flaws in the services' investigative systems and set in motion the events that led Air Force leadership to the FBI and brought OSI into existence. **GR**




Photo courtesy of the OSI History Office

General Meyers

A new enlisted voice

Enlisted Council will focus on professional development

We have many great opportunities to make OSI better. Colonel Simmons believes one such opportunity comes with the establishment of the AFOSI Enlisted Council.

Colonel Simmons' overarching goals for the council are to determine if our processes are right and create conditions for personal and mission success.

The council is chartered to identify and develop initiatives that contribute to the development, morale and advancement

of OSI enlisted Airmen. Its success will depend on our dedication and support.

While its focus will be primarily with enlisted issues, it will act much like the Investigations Career Civilian Policy Council in that it will also address other OSI personnel issues.

The council is comprised of a select cadre of OSI enlisted Airman, who were identified by their region commanders or directors for their strategic approach to identifying issues and solving problems affecting the enlisted corps.

The first council meeting will focus on the formation of its processes and procedures, the preparation of its communications plan, the identification of the top two or three issues to improve OSI, and establishment of committees to work these issues. Marty Pitt, Organizational Leadership and Development, will oversee the meeting.

I will chair the council and Chief Master Sgt. Mike Franklin, Region 6 superintendent, will be the first of the rotating senior advisors to the council members.

The council's first priority will be to help OSI leadership by identifying and recommending solutions for the easily-solved problems.

Council members will solicit ideas from members within their respective regions or directorates.

Emphasis will be placed on issues and initiatives that

Chief Master Sgt. Lynne Shell
OSI Command Chief Master Sergeant

All OSI members, regardless of status, can provide input to council members on ways to improve OSI.



enhance the professional development of our force, address quality of life and make the command more combat ready. All OSI members, regardless of status, can provide input on ways to improve OSI to council members.

Suggestions should be as specific as possible. For example, OSI does not have a formal mentoring program. Institutionalized mentoring programs are successful in improving retention, developing commitment and vectoring members for professional development. You could recommend such a program.

The OSI application time is another example of something affecting the entire command; it can take up to eight months to complete. If corrective action is recommended, the submitter should detail those actions.

For instance, they might recommend eliminating coworker interviews by concentrating on development. Enlisted Council members will continuously solicit input but will put on the full court press to identify issues 30 days prior to each meeting.

Leadership begins with each of us taking the time to make a difference. You have the power; help us improve OSI.

The council will hold its first meeting Sept. 15-16 at the headquarters. **GR**



USAF Enlisted Heritage

John Levitow, a loadmaster on an AC-47 gunship, acted quickly to save his aircraft after it was hit by enemy fire.

Wounded, he threw himself upon a magnesium flare and tossed it out of the aircraft moments before it ignited.

A1C's Levitow & Pitsenbarger are the lowest ranking airmen to receive the Medal of Honor - our nation's highest recognition for bravery in combat.

Information courtesy of the United States Air Force Museum

Council Members

TSgt. Eddie Vail
SA Janeth Herman
SA Michael Keach
SSgt. Santiago Fontanez
TSgt. Raymond Smith
SA Kimberly Huth
SA Keith Bradley
TSgt. Douglas Ray
SA Andrew Johnson
SSgt. Alvarez Velma
SA Jimmie Culbreth
SA Allyson Cary
SSgt. Carlos Bynum
MSgt. Keith Skeldon
SA Don Schwarzrock
SA Russell Akins
TSgt. Cesar Rodriguez
TSgt. Carla Green
MSgt. Sandra Johnson
SA Theodore Davis
TSgt. Timothy Smith
SA Michael Kairis

Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents found more than 1,200 child pornography on Tech. Sgt. John Lazard's computer.

The pornography investigation began in early December of 2003, when United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement contacted OSI, Det. 621, Yokota Air Base, Japan to inform them Sergeant Lazard was a possible subject in an undercover operation named Operation Falcon.

Operation Falcon was a joint task force, which involved the Internal Revenue Service, FBI,

United States Postal Inspection Service and the New Jersey district attorney. The task force was formed to investigate violations of selling, purchasing and possessing child pornography. This operation uncovered the

Predators on the Web

According to a survey conducted with 1,501 children by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, almost one in five (19 percent) of the young Internet users surveyed received an unwanted sexual solicitation in the year previous to the survey.

world's largest child pornography ring ever.

"With common use of the Internet in today's age of technology, child pornography has become a serious problem in our society," said Special Agent Christopher Ouellette, Det. 621 commander. "The volume of child pornography circulated on the Internet is staggering and the number of persons obtaining, trading and distributing these images is downright appalling."

More importantly, added Agent Ouellette, there appears to be a strong correlation between child pornography offenders and molesters of children.

In the case of Sergeant Lazard, the task force identified several Web sites containing images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined by federal statutes.

Undercover agents purchased memberships to these Web sites and began an electronic trace of funds, which ultimately led to a company identified as Regpay in the

Eliminating Child Exploitation on the Internet

**OSI aids in shutting down
pornography Web site**

**by SA Wade Stormer
OSI Det. 621**

**See Lazard on the
following page**



Lazard continued from previous page

Republic of Belarus.

ICE special agents and Belarusian authorities obtained a warrant to seize the companies' servers. These servers contained the payment information for all enrolled members.

Sergeant Lazard was among the thousands of individuals who had active memberships in Japan.

Det. 621 obtained a search authority for Sergeant Lazard's house with the intent of seizing his computer and any other items of evidentiary value.

Sergeant Lazard was detained and questioned while his residence was searched. He confessed to accessing the illegal Web sites and paying for his membership with his Enlisted Club credit card.

Det. 621 seized his computers and related media and more than 300 sexually related DVDs and VHS tapes, which all had to be separately reviewed for child pornography.

"After careful coordination with the 62 FIS Computer Crime Investigations chief, SA Paul Alvarez, the hard-drives were sent to the Defense Computer

Although the number of manhours dedicated to this case was staggering, seeing this Airman behind bars before he possibly became an assaulter of children was well worth it.

- SA Christopher Ouellette

Forensic Lab for examination," Agent Ouellette said. "The drives were eventually utilized as the first case in Project KIDS, a DCFL analysis procedure specifically created for the growing number of child pornography cases."

These images were then sent to the Innocent Images Division in Washington, D.C.

Innocent Images is a database maintained by the FBI that recognizes children who have been identified by investigative means as known victims. Sergeant Lazard's computer contained more than 90 known victims, the highest number ever collected at that time.

Agent Ouellette said the investigation would not have been as successful as it was without the teamwork at the national and local levels.

Sergeant Lazard ultimately plead guilty and was sentenced to 18 months confinement, reduction to E-1 and received a dishonorable discharge.

"Although the number of manhours dedicated to this case was staggering, seeing this Airman behind bars before he possibly became an assaulter of children, was well worth it," Agent Ouellette said. "By eliminating child pornographers within the Air Force, we are likely saving a child from possible molestation." **GR**

**This document has been sanitized
for viewing in the public domain.**



Photo by Sherry Rousselle

Region 2 builds new base pool

Just kidding, that's not a pool (or is it?) Reg. 2 members, led by Tech. Sgt. Andy Rousselle, took the opportunity to give the dependent children of Langley AFB, Va., Airmen a fish pond. The pond will be used by science classes to study water plants and fish and also to provide scenery to a common area used by all staff and students at the school.

The four individuals who installed the fish pond were (from left) Chief Master Sgt. Lonnie Eskeli, Matt Sites, Sergeant Rousselle and Tom Welch. Sergeant Rousselle's family was also helping improve the school.

See what everyone is talking about...



Read the
"Weekly Buzz"
in your e-mail every Friday!




Editor's
Notes

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ANDREWS AFB, MD 20762-7002



OSI

Historical Snapshot

Earl W. Smith
"Smitty"

1928-2005

"Smitty was a legend among the AFOSI family for 57 years, most of which were shared with OSI. Many know Smitty because of his outstanding reprographic abilities and his shadow boxes. No matter what our request for support, he was able to get it done, and it was always completed in superb fashion. He was a true master of customer service, and he helped make many a General."

- Col. Dana A. Simmons, AFOSI Commander

Smitty is pictured here in his Army Air Corps uniform